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The 1990s saw a global trend toward increased banking concen-
tration. Given that this emergence of larger financial institutions
seems to be a permanent change, understanding the implications of
the trend is a highly relevant exercise, in particular for small coun-
tries like Chile. This paper analyzes safety net issues for a highly
concentrated banking system in which, in addition, the total number
of players (banks) is low. The safety net is commonly understood as
the set of institutions created to guarantee the proper functioning of
the financial system (financial institutions and markets) in the
economy. It is typically considered to serve the following functions:
regulation and supervision, lender of last resort, and deposit insur-
ance. Regulation includes mechanisms for bank closure. One point of
this paper is that the importance of these functions and the way they
have to be designed or executed is not independent of either the level
of concentration or the total number of banks in the system. Recom-
mendations of best practices, then, have to take these considerations
into account.
This paper analyzes two dimensions of the impact of concentra-
tion on the banking safety net. The first is deposit insurance. In
recent years, important efforts in understanding deposit insurance
and deriving best practices for it has been made (see Demirgüç-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Financial
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Stability Forum, 2001). This paper contributes to this literature by
exploring the implications of concentration for deposit insurance de-
sign. One conclusion of the paper is that deposit insurance design
cannot be thought of as a stand-alone instrument, but rather must be
understood as an element of the intervention and resolution policy.
The second issue refers to systemic risk. I use the Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) approach to model a banking network to assess the im-
pact of banking concentration on systemic risk. A working metric of
the “too big to fail” situation can be derived in the model. The model
also allows testing measures that can contain systemic risk.
The organization of the paper is straightforward. Section 1 dis-
cusses deposit insurance. Section 2 presents the model and explores
the relation between systemic risk and concentration. A final section
summarizes the main results.
1. DEPOSIT INSURANCE, RESOLUTION METHODS, AND
BANKING CONCENTRATION
This section discusses the essential characteristics of a deposit
insurance system in the case of a highly concentrated banking sys-
tem featuring a low number of banks. The section starts by consider-
ing the role of deposit insurance as an element of the financial system’s
safety net. It then describes the design of such a system for a country
like Chile. Finally, the current situation of the deposit insurance
scheme in Chile is analyzed in the light of the previous discussion.
1.1 The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Safety Net
Deposit insurance is one of the most visible elements of the safety
net for the public—maybe even the only visible element. Conven-
tional wisdom typically considers the prevention of bank runs as the
main role of deposit insurance. Understanding the extent to which a
bank run can happen is crucial for designing an efficient deposit in-
surance system and setting realistic goals for it. In addition to this
role, deposit insurance protects small depositors. While this may sound
less grandiose, it may, in fact, be the more realistic objective.
The argument linking deposit insurance and bank runs was first
formally presented by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who hold that runs
can be a self-fulfilling equilibrium. This idea has been influential in
safety net design and has contributed to the view that financial mar-
kets are essentially unstable and prone to crises not necessarily backedBanking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 361
by fundamentals. Their paper shows that a certain level of deposit
insurance can make the “no run” strategy the dominant one, thus
eliminating the equilibria with runs. They acknowledge that lender-
of-last-resort functions can have the same effect, although they do
not explore it formally.
Two elements have to be considered for policy design, however.
First, empirical evidence indicates that historically, bank runs have
not necessarily been the expression of unfounded panics, but rather
have usually occurred in a context of real bank insolvency (Calomiris
and Mason, 1997; Gorton, 1988; Kaufman, 1994). Moreover, solvent
banks apparently have not suffered from contagion in these events—
that is, depositors have discriminated, and there have not been runs
on solvent banks. Second, if panics were a high probability event, the
only deterrent would be a back-up fund equal to total deposits. In the
absence of such a fund, rational depositors would know that the de-
posit insurance fund was limited, and they would have incentives to
run if they believe that others would run. The panic hypothesis thus
has clear predictions about the type of deposit insurance that should
be in place.
In this context, an alternative to deposit insurance is lending by
the central bank. If there is a run on a bank not based on fundamen-
tals, the central bank can step in and provide the required liquidity
against good collateral—as per the classical recommendation by
Bagehot (1873). If the run is based on fundamentals, then it is opti-
mal to close the bank. Moreover, if this is the case, the bank will
have been closed promptly and no run will ever have taken place.
There is hardly any reason to believe that the public will know about
a bank’s insolvency before the regulator.
The latter argument is incomplete, though, in that it leaves out a
case that points to a role for deposit insurance. This case arises when
a bank is weak and the regulator cannot fully discern whether the
bank is viable. A run is a possible response here, this time granted by
fundamentals. The central bank will have to make a decision about
whether to lend to this bank when it may not have full information.
It would risk losses if it lends and the bank is not solvent. On the
other hand, if the central bank does not lend, the economy may expe-
rience efficiency losses when projects with a positive net present value
are shut down. The need for a possibly inefficient decision can be
avoided with deposit insurance, which can contain the run on the
bank. What is needed to contain the run is a credible promise that
deposits will be repaid. The promise is credible as long as the deposit362 Rodrigo Cifuentes
insurance system has—or has credible access to—sufficient funds to
cover insured deposits. In this context, credibility implies that the
deposit insurance system should have sufficient funds to pay the de-
posits of weak banks and not of the entire system.
A corollary of this line of reasoning is that the type of crisis for
which the deposit insurance system could be useful is determined by
the amount of funds that the deposit insurance can credibly offer. If
policymakers expect the deposit insurance system to help in situa-
tions of widespread weakening of the banking system, then it should
have credible access to enough funds to cover all deposits in the sys-
tem. This would likely be a very large amount, which is why most
deposit insurance systems in the world are not expected to be useful
in cases of systemic crisis, but rather are used to deal with isolated
bank failures.1
An alternative approach leads to a similar conclusion. Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994) develop a theory of banking regulation based on
what they call the representation hypothesis. By this they mean that
regulation is necessary to represent a large number of small deposi-
tors who may find it costly to monitor a bank individually, in particu-
lar if their deposits are small. Regulation and supervision will restore
adequate incentives for good corporate governance of a bank in the
presence of an atomized principal. Deposit insurance arises in this
context to protect small depositors by minimizing their losses in case
of bank failure.
In reality, most deposit insurance systems seem closer to the
second approach than to the first. The first approach calls for protec-
tion for those most likely to run—arguably, large depositors. The
second is consistent with limits on protection per depositor.
1.2 Deposit Insurance in a Highly
Concentrated System
The key message of the previous section is that a deposit insur-
ance system should be designed to deal with isolated bank failures. In
contrast, deposit insurance should not be counted on in the face of
systemic problems, that is, when a substantial fraction of the banking
system is in trouble. This has two implications for highly concentrated
1. A recent report by the Financial Stability Forum (2001) explicitly recom-
mends that deposit insurance systems should not be expected to deal with sys-
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systems with a low number of institutions. First, such systems are
likely to be characterized by the presence of so-called systemic banks—
that is, banks that control a significant fraction of the systems assets.
The large size of these banks implies that the deposit insurance fund
necessary to cover the potential losses generated in paying the de-
posit insurance guarantee is too big. Moreover, the systemic impor-
tance of a large bank may be such that authorities would decide not
to close it even in the face of insolvency, and the bank’s problems
would have to be addressed in a way that does not imply depositor
repayments. This implies that the liabilities generated by the deposit
insurance should not be expected to be paid in the case of large banks.
Second, in the case of systems with a low number of banks, the sys-
tem will basically be relevant for only a few banks. Since failure is an
unusual event from an individual bank’s perspective, the deposit in-
surance guarantee should not need to be executed too often.
To illustrate this point, I compare the deposit insurance system
in the United States (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or
FDIC) with a hypothetical deposit insurance system in Chile. The
Chilean banking system contains far fewer banks than the United
States, with 25 and 8,505, respectively. The Chilean system is also
much more concentrated, as shown in table 1.
For the case of Chile, I consider the current structure of cover-
age, under which all demand deposits are covered in full, while term
deposits of natural persons are covered up to UF108 (approximately
US$2,600 at the current exchange rate). For simplicity, I assume
that all depositors qualify for insurance, that is, I make no distinction
between natural and legal persons. I leave comments on this cover-
age structure and room for improvement for the next section.
Share of total loans
Chile United States
Size group 2002 1999
Largest single bank 26 8
Largest five banks 74 27
Largest ten banks 92 37
Largest fifteen banks 99 43
Table 1. Chile and the United States: Concentration Measured
as Share of Total Loans
Percent
Source: SBIF (Sept. 2002); Group of Ten (2001).364 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Next, I assume that the Chilean system follows a similar rule to
that of the United States, namely, that its target fund is 1.25 percent
of covered deposits. This gives an approximation of the effective pro-
tection that the deposit insurance system is prepared to give for fail-
ures in the system. An alternative metric would be obtained by
considering effective premiums charged by deposit insurance systems
around the world. The data in the Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci (2000)
world database on deposit insurance shows that 58 out of the 68 coun-
tries with explicit deposit insurance charge premiums (the others
rely on ex post funding from surviving institutions or government
funding). The average maximum rate is 0.36 percent of deposits while
the median maximum rate is 0.24 percent. The problem is that it is
not possible to know from the database whether countries target a
fund of a determined size. However, a deposit insurance scheme charg-
ing the median rate will reach a target similar to that of the United
States in five years. Considering that the fund is, in fact, used to pay
out the guarantee, the United States target seems a reasonable or-
der of magnitude for the funds that real deposit insurance systems
should have in their steady states.
Table 2 compares the extent of protection under a concentrated
versus a decentralized system. In the case of Chile, coverage is deter-
mined from data on distribution of deposits by size. Coverage limits
are more generous in the United States, implying that the fraction of
deposits covered is more than twice that of Chile under the current
limits. The comparison is startling, however, when based on banks
that are effectively protected, that is, those whose insured deposits
are less than or equal to the deposit insurance fund. In the United
States the fund is relevant for almost eight thousand banks, whereas
Table 2. Protection in Chile and in the United States
Source: FDIC (2002); SBIF (2002).
a. Banks whose insured deposits are equal to or lower than the deposit insurance system fund, estimated as
1.25% of covered deposits.
b. At least.
Chile
United States Current Proposed
Measure of protection (FDIC) limits limits
Insured deposits as percent of total 67.2 28.7 28.1
Banks that are effectively covereda 7,888b 14 14
Banks in the deposit insurance system 7,966 25 25
Ratio (expressed as percent) 99 56 56
Total deposits in effectively covered 33.8b 8.6 8.6
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in Chile it would be relevant for only 14. These effectively protected
banks hold at least 34 percent of total deposits in the United States,
while that figure would be only 8.6 percent in Chile.
This analysis implies that the question of how to design and orga-
nize a deposit insurance system becomes less relevant in the case of a
highly concentrated system. This question has received a lot of atten-
tion from multilateral institutions in recent years, and sets of recom-
mendations and best practices have been produced (García, 1999; IMF,
1998; Financial Stability Forum, 2001). However, the necessary ele-
ments for a country’s decision on whether to have deposit insurance
and what to expect from it typically are not part of the discussion.
Deposit insurance policy must be seen as an element of a broader
policy encompassing the optimal intervention and resolution of dis-
tressed banks. The design of the specific elements of the deposit in-
surance should be carried out as part of this broader context. While
the challenges of intervention and resolution policy in a highly con-
centrated system are beyond the scope of this paper, some elements
to be considered are that the likelihood of banks being closed or liqui-
dated is low and that bank resolution will most likely come in the
form of purchase and assumption (P&A) operations. To minimize the
cost of these operations, regulation should stress early intervention.
The focus of the deposit guarantee management switches toward this
type of issues.
I now revisit three questions: Does deposit insurance make sense
in a highly concentrated system? If yes, should the deposit insurance
system have a fund? And finally, should the public sector participate
in the funding of the deposit insurance system? The answer to the
first question is yes. The two arguments put forward in support of an
explicit guarantee (Dewatripont and Tirole’s representation hypoth-
esis and the prevention of a run when it is difficult to discern the
solvency of a distressed bank) remain valid. In addition, depositors
can rationally anticipate that the likelihood of a large bank being
liquidated is lower than that of a small bank being liquidated, and
they may therefore prefer the large bank. This implies that an ex-
plicit deposit guarantee would correct a bias against small banks and
become a force against concentration.
The answer to the second question is also yes, but with a limit. As
explained before, a fund will definitely be used for depositors’ repay-
ment less in a concentrated than in a decentralized system. A fund
will also be needed, however, to cover potential losses in P&A opera-
tions. In either case, the frequency of these operations will be low,366 Rodrigo Cifuentes
which raises the question of whether the cost of maintaining a con-
tingency fund is justified. The alternative would be to raise funds
from the industry (and maybe from the government, as well, as dis-
cussed later) to cover the losses derived from the guarantee in the
case of a bank failure. This may be seen as unfair, however, as long
as the failed banks that caused the losses do not pay. The highly
concentrated case thus calls for maintaining a fund, but at a lower
level than in a less concentrated system.
With regard to the third question, the answer depends on the
rationale that supports the existence of the deposit insurance. If it is
only expected to protect small depositors, then the deposit insurance
should be funded by the industry. Protecting small depositors will
attract them as customers, which benefits the industry. If the deposit
insurance is expected to give the regulator the necessary time to
discern the viability of a bank, then a case can be made for partially
funding the deposit insurance through the public sector. Such a fund
would allow the authority to avoid the risk of acting as lender of last
resort to a bank that is potentially insolvent. At the same time, it
avoids the risk of closing a solvent bank, which would lead to effi-
ciency losses if projects with a positive net present value are cancelled.
1.3 Comments on the Current Deposit Insurance
Guarantee in Chile
The main facts of deposit insurance in Chile were described in
the previous section. Demand deposits are covered in full, while term
deposits are covered with a low limit (approximately US$2,600) and
for natural persons only. Table 2 shows the coverage implied by the
size distribution of deposits.
The main criticism of this structure is that protection to demand
deposits is unlimited. Depositors facing a situation of distress could
move from term to demand deposits massively, in search of full pro-
tection. The effective guarantee that the central bank is giving to the
public can thus be multiplied several times in a short period. In the
extreme case, all deposits could be moved to demand deposits, with
the effective coverage being multiplied by a factor of 3.5.
The logic of protecting demand deposits in full is that they are
deemed key for not generating disruptions in payments in the economy
in the case of a bank failure. This seems rather limited as a measure
for containing the systemic implications of such an event. Presum-
ably, a current account holder would also have term deposits.Banking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 367
Protecting current account deposits only does not mean that all ex-
pected payments by this holder in the future will be fulfilled.
This criticism notwithstanding, the real problem with the full
guarantee is the potential increase in the cost of closing a bank as a
result of shifting deposits.2 The logical solution is to limit the cover-
age of demand deposits. A second issue is the low limit on term de-
posits, which makes the threat of closing a bank less credible since it
would be politically difficult to implement.
A sensitive scheme would raise the protection of term deposits
and reduce that of demand deposits. The last column in table 2 shows
the effective protection granted when the limit on both types of de-
posit is set at 500 UF (approximately US$12,000). The size of the
guarantee is similar to that of the previous case, so the total protec-
tion granted to the system is similar. A key difference, though, is
that a major channel through which exposure could be artificially
inflated has been eliminated.
2. SYSTEMIC RISK AND BANKING CONCENTRATION
This section is concerned with the relation between banking con-
centration and systemic risk. Despite the lack of a specific definition,
systemic risk is the most common single argument used to justify
the regulation of the financial sector in general and the banking sys-
tem in particular. Explicitly or implicitly, systemic risk is usually
understood as the failure or risk of failure of a significant part of the
financial system.
Although systemic risk is widely employed as a primordial justifi-
cation for banking regulation, efforts to model it explicitly and con-
sider it explicitly in regulation design and evaluation are surprisingly
recent. The consensus view on banking was largely associated with
liquidity transformation as the main rationale for the existence of
banks and, from there, as the key characteristic determining their
risks. A seminal and largely influential paper in this tradition is Dia-
mond and Dybvig (1983). Their approach, however, does not leave
any room for a systemic analysis.
 2. The extent to which this is a real possibility can be verified in Japan, where
term deposits shifted to demand deposits when it was announced that the full
guarantee on deposits would be eliminated for term deposits but maintained for368 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Dow (2000) proposes a simple classification of the different forms
that systemic risk can take. Dow distinguishes four forms for think-
ing about systemic risk: contagion à la Diamond and Dybvig, in which
problems in one bank can generate a change in expectations and thus
produce runs on solvent banks; direct linkages, in which direct expo-
sures via interbank lending, deposits and derivatives contracts can
cause the transmission of problems in or the failure of one bank to
otherwise healthy banks; endogenous prices, in which problems in
one bank or group of banks can lead to changes in asset prices, which,
in turn, can cause problems in previously unaffected banks; and com-
mon shocks, in which a large fraction of the banking sector can be
weakened if they face similar risks.
The discussion in the previous section showed that pure expecta-
tions contagion (case 1) does not seem to be found in the historical
evidence. Efforts should therefore focus on the other three cases. In
this paper, I use a simple model that incorporates the second form of
systemic risk, in order to assess the impact that banking concentra-
tion can have on that risk. In addition, the model aims at deriving
possible regulatory measures that could be used to reduce systemic
risks. Future work should add cases 3 and 4 into the analysis.
2.1 Relevant Literature for this Paper
Theoretical models for analyzing banking systems have recently
been put forward by Rochet and Tirole (1996), Freixas, Parigi, and
Rochet (2000), and Allen and Gale (2000). Important results from these
works include the importance of a diversified set of linkages among
banks to increase the system’s resilience to shocks and the impor-
tance of unsecured direct linkages to promote cross-monitoring and
market discipline among banks.
Applied studies of the systemic risk implicit in interbank markets
have appeared in recent years applied to different countries. Furfine
(1999) for the United States, Upper and Worms (2001) for Germany,
Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2002) for Austria, and Wells (2002) for
the United Kingdom all use a framework described in Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) to assess this risk. Findings typically show that the prob-
abilities of systemic crises are low. Also, the systemic importance of
different banks can be determined.
This paper is related to this literature, but its goals are different.
Specifically, I am not interested in assessing the extent of systemic
risk implied by the current bilateral exposures of the Chilean bankingBanking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 369
system, but rather examine whether the tendency toward concentra-
tion has fundamentally affected the fragility of the system.
2.2 The Model
The interbank structure can be described by the following N×N
matrix:
Matrix X summarizes interbank cross-exposures, with xij repre-
senting the loans that bank i has made to bank j. Summing horizon-
tally I obtain the total liabilities of bank i, while the vertical sum
gives us all the interbank assets of bank j:
In addition, elements on the diagonal have to be zero; otherwise,
it would mean that banks are lending to themselves:
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) provide crucial elements for using this
model to assess the stability of a banking system in the context of a
payments problem. Specifically, they are interested in finding the clear-
ing vector for a system of nodes that hold liabilities among each other,
that is, the vector of payments from each node to the rest of the sys-
tem that clears the system. The clearing vector is what banks actu-
ally pay in equilibrium. If a bank defaults, its payments would be ex
post lower than its original liabilities. Using a fixed-point argument,
the authors prove that a clearing vector always exists and that it
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interdependence of the model. Because the solution is unique, it is
independent of the procedure taken to find the solution.
In the Eisenberg and Noe setup, payments are modeled in accor-
dance with bankruptcy law. If the node (bank) has not defaulted pay-
ments are made in full. If the node has defaulted, the remaining value
of the node is distributed among claim holders in proportion to their
claims, that is, liquidation rules assume limited liability.
In addition to the proof of existence and uniqueness, a useful out-
come of Eisenberg and Noe’s paper is the algorithm they use to find
the clearing vector, which they call the fictitious default algorithm.
This algorithm starts by assuming that all payments are fulfilled. If
no node has total income below payments, then total payments made
by each node form the unique clearing vector that solves the system,
and the algorithm stops. If a bank defaults, a new round is run, in
which liabilities by the failed node are distributed proportionally
among the creditor nodes. After this, it is checked whether other
nodes fail and so on. This algorithm is iterated until no bank fails.
Eisenberg and Noe’s procedure for finding a clearing vector in a net-
work of bilateral exposures thus becomes a natural procedure for
measuring the systemic risk imposed by a given bank.
To measure the systemic importance of each bank and, more gen-
erally, the stability of a certain banking structure, I allow banks to
fail one at a time. In each failure, I assume that a certain fraction, θ ,
of the value of the failing bank is lost, and this amount constitutes
the loss that the failed bank’s creditors experience (that is, the loss-
given-default ratio). I assume that each bank has a certain amount of
capital and that a bank fails when its total losses from failed banks
are larger than its capital.
The sequential nature of the algorithm gives us important infor-
mation about the stability of the system, such as the extent to which
failures are caused by contagion rather than direct exposures, the
number of rounds of failures that the failure of a large bank can gen-
erate, and so on.
2.3 Simulations
The object of study of this paper is the concentration of banks in
Chile. This is approximated by the distribution of Tier 1 capital among
banks. This concentration structure is compared with other struc-
tures with varying degrees of concentration. The objective is to de-
termine the extent to which the systemic risk implied by a system’s
members varies with the level of concentration.Banking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 371
Two scenarios are run in the simulations. In the first scenario,
limits to interbank borrowing and lending are purposely kept high in
order to generate many different possible scenarios for interbank link-
ages. Allowing high levels of interbank exposure makes contagion
more likely. These scenarios are generated randomly, as explained
below. The objective of this step is to test different metrics to mea-
sure systemic risk in a given system of interbank linkages. The sec-
ond scenario simulates the Chilean banking system more realistically.
In particular, limits to interbank lending are set at levels correspond-
ing with current regulation in Chile.
2.4 Parameters
This subsection presents the parameters chosen for the model in
order for it to reasonably resemble the case of Chile. In some cases,
data for the Chilean banking system are available. When data are not
available, Chilean regulation is used to define the limits within which
random draws are obtained for simulation.
Capital Structure
The base case is the effective capital structure in September 2002.
The alternative scenarios are generated following a simple rule: I
sequentially reduce the rate of growth of bank sizes by a factor of 0.2
of the original size distribution. The scenarios generated are summa-
rized in table 3.
Size group Baseline Case b Case c Case d Case e Case f
Largest single bank 23.7 19.4 14.8 10.8 7.3 4.0
Largest five banks 65.0 58.7 48.7 40.0 29.3 20.0
Largest ten banks 84.7 80.6 71.3 64.6 53.7 40.0
Largest fifteen banks 95.4 92.9 87.8 81.5 75.6 60.0
Summary statistic
Herfindahl index 1,157 937 702 556 458 400
No. banks 25 25 25 25 25 25
Table 3. Capital Structures Used in Simulations
Percent share
Source: FDIC (2002); SBIF (2002).
a. Banks whose insured deposits are equal to or lower than the deposit insurance system fund, estimated as
1.25% of covered deposits.
b. At least.372 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Limits to Interbank Lending
Current regulation imposes limits to interbank credit on both the
borrowing and lending side. On the lending side, Chilean banking law
establishes that interbank lending to a single bank cannot exceed 30
percent of the Tier 2 capital of the lender. Because Tier 2 capital can
be up to 50 percent larger than Tier 1 capital, this limit implies that
lending to a single bank can be as much as 45 percent of Tier 1 capi-
tal. These limits refer to lending and not to total exposure. Exposure
can be larger than lending as a result of deposits and derivative con-
tracts. There is no limit to overall interbank exposure.
On the borrowing side, overall interbank term (as opposed to de-
mand) liabilities with residual maturity of less than one year cannot
exceed 10 percent of assets. In addition, term liabilities with a spe-
cific bank cannot exceed 3 percent of the assets of either the bor-
rower or the lender, whichever is the largest. In a concentrated
banking system, this limit becomes less relevant, since it is deter-
mined by the size of the largest bank in a credit relationship. In par-
ticular, medium and small banks can have large exposures to a big
bank. Finally, liabilities payable on demand or with a residual matu-
rity of over a year are not subject to any limit.
Limits to interbank exposures thus are not very restrictive on
either side of the balance sheet. On the lending side, total lending is
not limited and individual exposure can be increased by means other
than lending. On the liabilities side, limits can be exceeded via long-
term borrowing. Long-term interbank lending can be high in some
countries: Upper and Worms (2001) report that in Germany as of
December 1998, 36 percent of all interbank liabilities have a matu-
rity of four years or more.
For the first scenario I assume a limit of 30 percent on interbank
assets and liabilities. For the second scenario, I impose a 10 percent
limit to interbank assets and liabilities.
Interbank Linkages
In the first scenario, interbank lending is generated randomly. I
assume that the ratios of overall interbank assets and liabilities to
total assets are random variables for each bank, distributed uniformly
between 0 and the defined upper limit. This implies that the inter-
bank assets and liabilities of a given bank are not related in a predict-
able way—that is, that the level of a bank’s interbank assets does notBanking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 373
say anything about the level of its liabilities. This may not be true for
certain banks that typically operate on either the lending or borrow-
ing side of the market (money center banks, for example), but it is a
reasonable assumption for most banks.
From the two ratios obtained for each bank, total interbank as-
sets and liabilities for each bank are obtained using the level of the
bank’s total assets. The next step is to generate the matrix X, which
will tell us how the interbank connections are. Since assets and li-
abilities are generated randomly, an adjustment has to be made to
ensure that they add up to the same amount.
Banks can be connected to each other in a number of ways. Ac-
cording to Allen and Gale (2000), the more diversified are the links of
each bank, the more resilient is the system to shocks. I generate
interconnections through an algorithm that generates maximum di-
versification or “connectedness” of the structure given the total as-
sets and liabilities that each bank wishes to hold.
The algorithm starts by randomly determining a vector of total
interbank assets (vector a of elements ak) and one of total interbank
liabilities (vector l of elements lk). They represent, respectively, the
total interbank assets and liabilities that a bank wishes to hold. From
them, I would like to generate matrix X. This may not be possible,
since it amounts to solving N x (N – 1) unknowns with 2N equations.
Given this, I follow an algorithm to build a matrix X that is as
consistent as possible with vectors a and l. Each element of vector a
is distributed as liabilities of the other banks (that is, in a column of
matrix X) in proportion to vector l. In the next step, allocated liabili-
ties are summed for each recipient bank (horizontal sum in matrix X)
and compared to the desired liabilities indicated by vector l. Allo-
cated and desired liabilities may differ. When the allocated liabilities
of a recipient bank are larger than its desired liabilities, the excess is
subtracted proportionally from each creditor bank and the desired
liabilities for the recipient bank are set to zero for the next round.
The assets allocated in excess are marked as pending for each credi-
tor bank. Should the allocated liabilities be less than desired liabili-
ties, this difference will be the desired liabilities for the next round.
In the next round, a similar allocation takes place where the pend-
ing assets of each creditor bank are distributed among recipient banks
in proportion to their remaining desired liabilities. Excesses are de-
termined and a new round is run until either all assets are allocated
or all desired liabilities are fulfilled. Whichever happens first will de-
termine the total size of the interbank market. The algorithm allo-
cates assets in a few rounds.374 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Note that the algorithm as described generates total interbank
assets and liabilities independently of each other, and it stops when
the lower of the two is allocated. It thus biases randomly generated
interbank relations to the conservative side, which is assuming a low
level of interconnectivity among banks.
Loss-given-default Ratio
Simulations are run considering loss ratios between 10 percent
and 50 percent. James (1991) calculates loss ratios in bank failures at
40 percent. The latter is a standard value for calibrated models in
this literature. This is a conservative value, in the sense that it cal-
culates the final loss after a long period during which assets are liqui-
dated. The stress imposed on a creditor bank at the time of the bank
failure can be a lot larger.
Total Assets
Total assets are generated from capital assuming the regulatory
ratio of Tier 1 capital to assets of 3 percent.
2.5 Results
As mentioned earlier, results are obtained in two stages. In the
first, constraints on interbank borrowing are relaxed in order to gen-
erate a large number of banking failures and contagion. This stage
attempts to test the accuracy of different metrics for systemic risk.
The second stage explores the Chilean system more realistically and
uses the results of the first stage to explore measures to contain
systemic risk.
First Simulations
The objective of the first simulations is to explore the dynamics
of the model and to determine metrics for measuring the systemic
risk implicit in a given system. Table 4 provides a summary of some
of the findings. For each possible capital structure, I simulate a hun-
dred different interbank markets. The resilience of each case of in-
terbank market is determined through the fictitious default algorithm.
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one other bank, the whole interbank structure is marked as capable
of generating contagion.
Table 4 reports the average size of the interbank market gener-
ated in each case, which is similar across capital structures. The sec-
ond line shows that systemic risk differs considerably across structures.
For the baseline capital structure, in 70 out of 100 scenarios there is
at least one bank whose failure can lead to the failure of a second
bank. The next line shows that the total number of banks affected in
each case is large, as is the average level of assets damaged when
contagion exists.
The incidence of contagion drops considerably as the capital struc-
tures become less concentrated. Beginning with structure d, in which
the largest bank accounts for about 11 percent of the system, there
are no more cases of contagion under the parameters of this exer-
cise. However, while reducing concentration lowers the incidence of
contagion considerably, when contagion does occur (structures b and
c), it causes a similar level of damage as measured by number of
banks and assets affected. In fact, the damage increases slightly, sug-
gesting that the worst contagion cases are the last to disappear.
Next, I run regressions based on the data generated in the simu-
lations to determine possible metrics for assessing the systemic risk
embedded in a given system of interbank linkages. I define the de-
pendent variable as the worst loss in total assets that can occur in a
certain system of interbank linkages. I try different metrics as poten-
tial explanatory variables, focusing on variables that could be con-
structed from balance sheet data by a regulator.
Capital structure
System indicator Baseline Case b Case c Case d Case e
Average interbank assets 15.2 15.0 15.0 14.9 14.8
   over total assets (percent)
Cases of contagion out of 100 70 42 14 0 0
Average no. banks affected 15.8 15.0 15.8 0 0
   given contagiona
Average assets affected given 52.1 51.3 59.6 0 0
   contagion (percent)a
Assets failed in worst 79.8 80.1 76.5 0 0
   contagion case (percent)
Table 4. Systemic Risk
a. The baseline capital structure generates six cases in which two banks can generate contagion for a given
interbank matrix; the worst case was taken for the table.376 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Two metrics seem to give interesting information. One is an at-
tempt to measure interconnectedness; it is defined as the standard de-
viation of the exposure of each bank to each other bank as a percentage
of its capital. In practical terms, it consists of dividing each row i of
matrix X by the capital stock of the ith bank and taking the standard
deviation of this matrix without considering elements in the diago-
nal. A better-connected (that is, more diversified) system will have a
lower standard deviation of exposures, so I expect a positive relation
between this metric and the dependent variable. The second variable
captures the risk imposed on the system by the bank that causes the
worst systemic crisis when it fails. I define this measure of “risk im-
posed” as the total liabilities of a bank (the column sum of matrix X)
over the combined capital stock of all the other banks. Again, the
higher the risk imposed by a bank, the higher the potential damage,
so I again expect a positive coefficient.
Table 5 shows the results of the regressions. Each regression is
run a second time with dummy variables for the type of capital struc-
ture. The first metric (standard deviation of exposure) is significant
and gives a relatively good account of systemic risk when combined
with the total size of the interbank market. R squared increases when
dummy variables are included. This is due to cases d and e, in which
failures never occur. The “risk imposed” variable has an even better
explanatory power. As it turns out, including other variables in this
specification does not help. This finding is useful for policy purposes,
as discussed in the next section.
Second Simulations
The second set of simulations assesses the risks of the current
structure of concentration in Chile in a more meaningful way. Mea-
sures of both bank failures and damaged assets are reported. Dam-
aged assets are defined as the assets of banks that suffer a capital
loss of at least 50 percent but less than 100 percent. The idea is to
measure not only absolute failures, but also banks that have been
substantially weakened. In these situations, the supervisor will most
likely have to take some corrective action.
Interbank assets and liabilities are limited to 10 percent, and I
assume that banks are close to that number. This assumption may
seem extreme, but it is in the extreme scenarios that resilience is
tested. Moreover, as reported above, interbank assets and liabilities
can be higher than 10 percent of assets according to current regula-
tion in Chile.Banking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 377
In these simulations, I also explore the impact of different struc-
tures of interconnections. In particular, I study the impact of varying
the number of counterparties with which banks interact. I analyze
cases for a number of counterparties ranging from three to twenty.
These need not to be the same on the borrowing and lending side.
Nor do they form closed sets, in the sense that the counterparties of
a given bank do not have the same counterparties as that bank. Lim-
iting the number of counterparties adds realism to the exercise, in
that it does not seem plausible that banks have relations with all
existing banks.
For a given number of counterparties, the interbank matrix can
take many possible forms. In other words, there are many ways to
pick C counterparties from N – 1 banks, when C is lower than (N –1).
Table 5. Key Determinants of Asset Lossa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Constant
Interbank/total assets











All variables significant at 1 percent unless otherwise noted.
a. The dependent variable is the fraction of total assets failed to total assets in the worst-case scenario of a given
system of interbank linkages. The explanatory variables are as follows: Interbank/total assets is the standard
deviation of the exposure of each bank to each other bank as a percentage of its capital; risk imposed is the total
liabilities of a bank (the row sum of matrix X) over the combined capital stock of all the other banks.
* Significant at 2 percent.
** Not significant at 10 percent.





















































I thus randomly generate 1,000 interbank matrices for each number
of desired counterparties. I focus on symmetric cases only. That is, if
bank 1 has interbank liabilities with, say, banks 4 and 5, then bank 2
has interbank liabilities with banks 5 and 6. This ensures that all
banks have the same systemic importance in terms of their connec-
tions, and they only differ in their size.
Results are presented in figures 1 to 9. First, I present the effect
of different capital structures on systemic risk, measured as both
damaged assets (as defined earlier) and the assets of failed banks. I
then present the effect on systemic risk of limiting the risk that banks
can impose on the rest of the system under the current capital struc-
ture of banks in Chile. In all cases, the average of the fraction of
damaged or failed assets across the 1,000 cases is presented, as well
as the tenth and ninetieth percentiles.
Figures 1 and 2 present the results for the cases of loss-given-
default ratios (θ ) of 20 percent and 30 percent, respectively. At these
levels of θ , there are no failures by contagion. The figures show the
fraction of damaged assets for three cases of the capital structure
(the baseline case, case c, and case e) and for a number of
counterparties ranging from three to twenty. The most important
result is that systemic damage increases with the concentration of
the banking system. In the less concentrated system (case e), dam-
age is low and it appears only in cases of a small number of
counterparties (less than 6). This implies that concentration increases
systemic damage in the event of failure.
Figure 1. Damaged Assets under Different Levels
of Concentration, θθθθθ  = 0.2
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentileBanking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 379
The second interesting result is that for the more concentrated
banking systems, the relation between total damage and the number
of counterparties is not monotonic. Figure 3, in particular, shows
that for the baseline case, increasing the number of counterparties
from the lowest figure (three) increases the damage caused in the
system by the failure of a bank; this continues until 11 counterparties
are reached, after which systemic damage falls. This result is con-
trary to the conventional wisdom that a better-connected system is
always safer than a less connected one. Here, the increase in inter-
connections—rather than spreading the shock of the initial failure over
a larger number of counterparties and thereby making it more diffi-
cult for the event to lead other banks into default—is dominated by the
effect of more interconnections increasing the number of banks that
can be affected by the initial bank failure. This result is more likely to
occur with greater heterogeneity of bank sizes. This is confirmed by
the fact that the inverted-U shape disappears when the concentra-
tion in the banking system is reduced.
Figures 3 and 4 report cases with θ  equal to 40 percent and 50
percent, respectively. These figures report the assets of failed banks
as a proportion of total assets. Results are analogous to those shown
in figures 1 and 2. Damage is higher the higher the concentration of
banks for a given number of counterparties in almost all the cases.3
3. The only exceptions are the cases of θ  = 0.5 with three and four
counterparties.
Figure 2. Damaged Assets under Different Levels of
Concentration, θ  θ θ  θ θ  = 0.3
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile380 Rodrigo Cifuentes
The relation between damage and the number of counterparties has an
inverted-U shape that disappears as concentration is reduced. Finally,
note that going from the base structure to case c involves larger ben-
efits than going from case c to case e. Gains in moving from the base
structure to case c can be large. The case θ  = 0.4 shows that case c has
no systemic failures in up to 90 percent of the cases with eight
counterparties. Reaching this level of stability under the baseline struc-
ture requires increasing the number of counterparties to fifteen.
Results from the first set of simulations showed that “risk imposed”
was a key determinant of systemic risk. Consequently, systemic risk
Figure 4. Failed Assets under Different Levels
of Concentration, θθθθθ  = 0.5
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile
Figure 3. Failed Assets under Different Levels of
Concentration, θθθθθ  = 0.4
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentileBanking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 381
can be contained by limiting the level of risk imposed on the rest of the
system. I searched through the simulations to find the largest value
for the “risk imposed” variable that generates no failures by contagion
in 95 percent of the cases given θ  = 40 percent and ten counterparties.
It turns out that this number is 0.25. This is the maximum ratio of
liabilities in the interbank market to the combined capital of all other
banks in the system. This number can be translated into a maximum
ratio of interbank liabilities to total assets as a function of the fraction
of capital that a given bank represents in the total. The latter repre-
sentation is easier to interpret intuitively than the former.
Figure 5 shows the rule of the maximum liabilities as a function of
the ratio of a bank’s capital to total system capital. A 10 percent maxi-
mum is exogenously imposed. The rule implies that banks whose capi-
tal represents more than 7.5 percent of total capital should have a limit
on total interbank liabilities below 10 percent of their assets. A bank
whose capital represents 20 percent of the system, for example, should
not have more than 3.7 percent of its assets as interbank liabilities.
The effect of the rule is shown in figures 6 through 9, which can
be directly compared with figures 1 through 4. The rule effectively
reduces systemic damage in all cases. Failures by contagion virtually
disappear in all cases with ten or more counterparties, even in the
case of θ  = 50 percent. This contrasts sharply with the case of the
base structure of concentration.
The rule leaves the system with a measure of potential systemic
damage lower than that achieved under concentration structure c, in
some cases by a large amount. Incidentally, it has an analogous effect
on reducing concentration in eliminating the inverted-U shape of the
impact of increasing connections over systemic damage.
Figure 5. Maximum Interbank LiabilitiesFigure 6. Damaged Assets, with and without Rule, θ  θ  θ  θ  θ  = 0.2
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile
Figure 8. Failed Assets with and without Rule, θθθθθ  = 0.4
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile
Figure 7. Damaged Assets with and without Rule, θθθθθ  = 0.3
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentileBanking Concentration: Implications for Systemic Risk 383
3. FINAL REMARKS
This paper has analyzed the key characteristics of a safety net for
a financial system characterized by high concentration and a low to-
tal number of banks. The first section discussed the role of deposit
insurance, highlighting the diminished importance of deposit insur-
ance in the case of a system with a low number of banks. The design
of a deposit insurance system should therefore be embedded in a more
general policy of intervention and resolution.
A second message from the first section is that the issue of sys-
temic risk becomes crucial in a highly concentrated banking system.
The second section thus analyzed systemic risk in the case of the
Chilean banking system and proposed regulatory measures to help
contain it. Specifically, this section showed how the risk of idiosyn-
cratic shocks spreading through the system are substantially higher
in concentrated systems than in decentralized ones. It then described
a specific regulatory measure that can reduce this risk.
Figure 9. Failed Assets with and without Rule, θθθθθ  = 0.5
Average, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile384 Rodrigo Cifuentes
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